Deposit dollarization and the financial sector in emerging economies by Honohan, Patrick & Shi, Anging
%MpS  X1'j4
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2748
Deposit Dollarization  An increasing  share of bank
deposits  in developing
and the Financial Sector  countries is denominated in
in  Emerging  Economis  .foreign  currency.  This  trend
may have adverse
implications  for the cost  and





















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2748
Summary findings
Analyzing new data, Honohan  and Shi find that the  probably helps to explain the authors'  finding that
general trend toward increased use of foreign-currency-  dollarization is associated with an increase in banking
denominated bank deposits in emerging markets has  spreads.
continued, despite declines in a few countries. Their  The authors'  evidence supports, though only weakly,
analysis of the new data suggests  that a sizable fraction  the conjecture that dollarization would tend to raise
(about half, on average) of funds switched to dollar  wholesale interest rates systematically through  a peso
deposit accounts are effectively exported through the  premium. In contrast, greater dollarization is clearly
banking system, thereby reducing the supply of credit.  associated with a higher pass-through coefficient from
Moreover, increases in deposit dollarization are  exchange rate change to consumer prices, potentially
associated with increases in offshore deposits, which  increasing nominal risk in the economy.
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Introduction
In many countries, usually following episodes of high inflation and sudden depreciation,
banks and their customers have spontaneously shifted part of their business to foreign
currency-denominated deposits and loans, a trend known as dollarization (even though
other foreign currencies such as the DM/Euro have been involved in some countries').
Although not altogether irreversible -- macro stabilization and legislation prohibiting it
has reduced dollarization in some countries -- it seems clear that this is a phenomenon
that will be with us for the foreseeable future.
This paper reviews recent trends in partial dollarization 2 of bank deposits in developing
countries, assembling an expanded data set on deposit dollarization. It identifies
empirical regularities in the data and considers some implications for financial sector
stability and performance.
Though the quality and comparability of the data is not uniformly high, we do now have
quantitative information on deposit dollarization for 58 emerging economies, several
more than were covered in the important survey by Balino et al (1999). In addition, we
have added up to five years to those countries that were in the earlier paper (its data
ended at 1995). Comparing the most recent data with that for dollarization in 1995 shows
that there has been a continued trend to increased dollarization.
Much of the policy discussion has rightly focused on monetary stabilization issues, which
are not discussed in this paper.  Instead we examine issues of risk and pricing.  At the
level of the individual depositor, availability of foreign currency deposits offer risk-
reduction possibilities, the importance of which will depend inter alia on the degree of
macro volatility and the extent to which foreign currency is a useful inflation hedge.  But
at the level of the system as a whole, increased deposit dollarization can be associated
with a change in the system's vulnerability to shocks. It can also affect the supply and
cost of credit, depending on how it influences the supply of deposits to banks, and their
' Interestingly,  the dominance of the US dollar can survive even when a currency board with a peg against
the euro has been established, as has recently been the case in Bulgaria.
2 This is to be distinguished from "official" or "full" dollarization, i.e. formal adoption of the US dollar as
the sole legal tender and unit of account in a country (as recently in Ecuador)  Related but distinct concepts
are (i) use of foreign currency bills or notes, which is known as "currency substitution"; (ii) adoption of a
fixed peg against the dollar, backed by a currency board, as in Hong Kong.  (Indeed, currency board
arrangements have sometimes been associated with prohibition of denominating bank deposits or loans in
foreign currency.)currency composition. For example, banks need to hedge the currency risk and may not
safely be able to pass it on by lending foreign currency to local borrowers who do not
have foreign currency receivables. The market power of banks may also be affected,
resulting in higher spreads. Finally, if increased dollarization is associated with a higher
risk premium on local currency assets, real interest rates on large deposits and money
market assets denominated in local currency may also increase to clear the market.
Recent papers have clarified many of the policy issues involved but there remain wide
differences of opinion, some of them attributable to a lack of agreement on the ultimate
causes and mechanisms involved. In this paper we throw empirical light on several of the
most important building blocks of an understanding of how dollarization works.  In
particular, we explore
(a) whether pass-through of exchange rate changes tends to be higher with higher
dollarization - we find that it is;
(b) to what extent there is an irreversibility or 'ratchet effect' involved - here we find
evidence of considerable time-variation in dollarization and some examples of
reversibility;
(c) the relation between dollarization and the degree to which nonbank residents have
deposits in off-shore banks - we find that these two appear to rise and fall
together;
(d) the link between deposit dollarization and the volume and currency composition
of bank lending - we find that banks tend to place offshore as much as half of
increased dollar deposits received;
(e) whether bank interest margins are systematically associated with the degree of
dollarization - the indications are that spreads rise with increased dollarization;
and
(f)  whether real deposit interest rates increase with dollarization - there is some
evidence that they do.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief review of theoretical
predictions about the relationships (mentioned above) between dollarization, the supply
of credit, interest rates and spreads and the speed of price pass-through. This is followed
(Section 2) by a description of recent developments in deposit dollarization as revealed
by the data, including evidence on the supposed ratchet effect. For the remaining five
issues, Section 3 presents regression results based on our new data.  Section 4 considers
consequences for risk in the banking system.  Section 5 concludes with some remarks on
policy implications.
1.  Causes and Consequences of Dollarization: Review of Some Theoretical Points
The degree of dollarization is something that is endogenously determined by agents
optimizing within the constraints presented to them by policy and technology.  Therefore
it would be unwise to jump to causal conclusions when one observes correlations
between the degree of deposit dollarization and other macro or financial sector variables.
3Nevertheless, a sizable body of theory about the behavior of different classes of agent
faced with the choice between home and foreign-currency  denominated instruments 3 does
help us interpret why some such correlations may be observed. We focus on six distinct
aspects, as listed in the introduction.
Determinants of dollarization - the role ofpass-through
Holding dollar deposits helps protect against devaluation of the local currency, but this
protection is usually bought at a price, in the form of lower nominal interest rates,
inasmuch as interest rate differentials will adjust to offset, at least partially, the expected
rate of depreciation. 4 But nominal devaluation of the local currency is not the only risk
to be borne in mind. Real exchange rate fluctuations mean that holding dollar deposits is
not itself a risk-free strategy for a depositor whose consumption patters include local as
well as imported goods. In order to minimize the variance of a portfolio's real value the
mix of foreign and local currency assets must be chosen with reference both to the
variance of inflation and to the variance of the real exchange rate, as well as to
covariances. The higher the variance of domestic inflation, the higher the share of
dollars in the minimum variance portfolio; but the higher the variance of the real
exchange rate, the lower the share of dollars. Note that the minimum variance approach
is relevant to borrowers as well as to lenders.
The optimal portfolio will differ from the minimum variance portfolio to the extent that
investors are prepared to accept a higher risk in return for a higher expected return.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as both borrowers and lenders can benefit from reduced real
variance, the minimum variance calculations point to likely important influences on the
equilibrium share of dollarization in the economy.  Indeed, empirical results reported by
Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998) confirm the predicted correlations between the degree of
dollarization and these determinants of the minimum variance portfolio. 5 Alternative
specifications, for example those expressed in terms of the risk of rare but large
devaluations, may perform equally well; and other considerations may also be important. 6
3 This  builds  in  part  on an older  literature  on  the  use  of  foreign  currency  notes  and  coin  - so-called  currency
substitution  (see  Box 1).
4As  the  expression  goes  in Latin  America,  one  has  to choose  between  eating  (higher  interest  rate)  and
sleeping  (protection  against  devaluation).
5 The  model  of Ize  and  Levy-Yeyati  has  depositors  choosing  between  three  assets:  onshore  local  currency
and both on-and -offshore forex deposits.  Simple diversification arguments suggest holding some of each.
The minimum variance portfolio (MVP) depends on the variance of real return of each and their
covariance; deviations from MVP will be reflected in inflows or outflows. These calculations show that the
dollarization  ratio should increase with volatility of inflation but decline with the volatility of real exchange
rate depreciation (their equation 14). This implies, somewhat counterintuitively that allowing the exchange
rate to float, while targeting inflation could have the effect of reducing dollarization, whereas a pegged
exchange rate will have this effect even if it reduces inflation & inflation volatility.
6 Hausman (2000) introduces an additional dimension of covariance, namely of exchange rates and interest
rates with income. He argues that devaluation expectations may be correlated with income (low-income
periods having high devaluation expectations) and suggests that, because of the perverse correlation
between financial returns and income, people will prefer to save in foreign currency.
4A rapid pass-through of exchange rate changes into local prices will tend to stabilize real
exchange rates, which in turn will boost dollarization, according to the above reasoning
(cf. Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 1998). But, although the determinants of pass-through and
dollarization certainly overlap, models differ as to how closely related they are related. 7
The degree of correlation between the two is thus an empirical question. 8
Hysteresis or the 'ratchet effect'
While the initial impetus for dollarization often comes from disruption or extreme
volatility in financial markets,  it has often been observed that the share of dollarization
remains high even when domestic financial conditions settle down. For one reason or
another, once depositors become used to holding foreign currency-denominated  deposits,
they are slow to divest themselves of them even if the initial cause that triggered the
holdings is reversed. This hysteresis or ratchet effect could be due to the set-up costs of
establishing a dollar deposit and adjusting one's business accordingly. Once one has paid
the set-up costs one may as well continue to benefit from the risk-reduction that can be
gained from holding a mixed portfolio of currencies (Guidotti and Rodriguez, 19929,
Uribe, 199710).  Alternatively, the persistence of a high rate of dollarization long after the
crisis could result from the persistence of long-lived residual anxieties of a recurrence
that one episode of volatility can bring.
Deposit dollarization vs. offshore holdings
Even where FX deposits are perrnitted,  1 depositors may prefer to place their FX deposits
abroad, sometimes in banks that are officially offshore but have a significant defacto
onshore presence. They will do so especially if there is a risk of expropriation, or of
enforced conversion of onshore FX deposits at an unfavorable exchange rate.  12
7For  example, Calvo 2000b works with a model of imperfect competition between firms with staggered
price-setting; his model generates little influence of bank loan) dollarization (which he calls 'liability
dollarization') on pricing decisions and hence on pass-through.
s Some have suggested that there is no correlation in practice (cf. Gonzalez, 2000).
9 Guidotti and Rodriguez provide a useful review of the early experience of dollarization in four Latin
American countries Bolivia (1986-1990), Mexico (1972-1981), Peru (1978-1984) and Uruguay (1972-
1989). Their conclusion on the irreversible nature of dollarization is worth quoting in extenso  "... two of
the four dollarization episodes examined - those of Mexico and Peru ...ended with a forced de-
dollarization. In addition, Bolivia experienced a forced de-dollarization in November 1982 ... In all of these
cases, de-dollarization took the form of a defacto  conversion of foreign currency deposits held by the
private sector into domestic currency. In all cases, the de-dollarization implied devaluations. In addition,
de-dollarization was accompanied, in all cases, by the imposition of capital and exchange controls,
designed to impede any rapid reconstitution of private foreign assets holdings. Foreign currency deposits
were allowed back in Bolivia in 1984 and in 1990 in Peru. The fact that dollarization have been reversed
only through confiscation schemes suggests a stylized fact: in itself dollarization appears to be, to a large
extent, an irreversible  phenomenon."  (op. cit., p. 8).
'° In Uribe's model, society accumulates a stock of "dollarization capital" depending on what proportion of
transactions are done in dollars last period. This lowers the cost of doing so in the future.  But some goods
are infinitely costly to buy in dollars, so there is always a demand for local currency.  He shows that such
an economy has two steady states, one with no dollars, other with both currencies in use.
1  l Banks in several countries are restricted in the extent to which they are allowed to offer foreign-currency
denominated deposits and loans to domestic customers.  For example, dollarization is outlawed in Brazil
and Venezuela (but not in Argentina.)
12 Hanson (2001) shows that small countries with disproportionately small values for M2 have higher than
average offshore holdings of deposits as recorded in the BIS statistics.
5Furthermore, several countries have experienced a form of round-tripping where offshore
borrowing are fully backed by offshore deposits made by the borrower. The goals of
such back-to-back arrangements may include tax avoidance and protection against
expropriation.
Impact of deposit dollarization on bank lending
A shift by depositors in favor of dollars is unlikely to be associated with a corresponding
one-for-one shift in the currency composition of the banks' lending. Faced with the need
to hedge an increase in dollar deposits banks can denominate more of their loans in
dollars and/or reinvest some of the deposited dollars abroad. There is a limit to which the
first route can be done safely: after all, dollar-denominated  loans to local firms is an
imperfect hedge for dollar liabilities, especially if the borrower has no foreign currency
receivables (or more precisely unless the borrower stands otherwise to benefit from a
nominal depreciation). Many banks have found to their cost that they have merely
substituted credit risk for exchange rate risk.
The sizable risk of an open foreign exchange position and prudential limitations thus
implies that, once the limit to safe and profitable FX lending at home has been reached,
the remainder of the resources raised through dollar deposits at the bank will be placed
into the international money market.
An obviously relevant consideration in this regard is how fast exchange rate changes pass
through into local prices. If the pass-through is very fast, then local borrowers may be
able to assume the exchange risk of a foreign-currency denominated loan even if they
have no foreign currency receivables.
Furthermore, banks typically have more market power in lending than in deposits. This
also argues that the impact of changes in deposit dollarization on the share of dollars in
bank lending could be limited. By the same token, an increase in the FX share of a
constant total of deposits could result in a lower volume of lending overall.
Banks' market power
If overall lending declines (for the reasons outlined above), this may be associated with
higher bank lending spreads. More generally, availability of foreign currency resources
can open profitable new lines of business and help enhance the profitability of loan
markets by segmenting sub-markets.13
Dollarization and currency risk premium
If the experience or risk of sharp devaluation has often been the trigger for deposit
dollarization, so too it is possible that the degree of dollarization might in turn influence
the risk of a policy-induced devaluation.  Where deposit dollarization is high, will
governments be more tempted to engineer a surprise devaluation? If so, local currency
13 Catao  and Terrones  (2000)  provide  a model  in which  oligopolistic  banks  segment  the two classes  of
borrower,  international  trading  or not, making  the strong  assumption  that dollar  loans  are offered  only  to
the former.  They  explore  the theoretical  impact  of changes  in the international  interest  rate on the degree  of
dollarization  and  the intermediation  spread.
6depositors will protect themselves from such risks by insisting on a higher interest rate
differential, which will show up as a higher real interest rate over a period where the
devaluation does not occur.
Although there is no general agreement on the point, 14 it can be argued that high
dollarization and speed of pass-through might increase the risk of a sizable devaluation
being engineered by the authorities to relieve fiscal pressure.'5 Here we picture a heavily
indebted government wishing to impose a one-off capital loss on holders of government
debt denominated in local currency, in order to reduce the real value of the government's
debt.  If pass-through is rapid, then any change in relative prices will be short-lived;
indeed relative prices and the real exchange rate will be essentially fixed. If, in addition,
dollarization is high, then the impact of a devaluation on a well-hedged banking system
will also be slight. The temptation for a surprise devaluation to improve the fiscal
position will be especially high in such conditions, in that the real value of local-currency
denominated debt can be reduced with little impact on competitiveness conditions or the
banking system.'6 These are thus the conditions for a high currency risk premium.
This can be seen as an application of the fiscal theory of the price level according to
which a major influence on inflation and exchange rate developments comes through the
governmnent's  incentive to run a deficit.  In order to finance this deficit, the government
may have recourse to the inflation tax. If prices and wages are somewhat sticky this will
lead to exchange rate overshooting and a costly period of misaligned relative prices. The
degree of dollarization and the speed of pass-through both influence the incentive for
reliance on the inflation tax and hence the degree to which shocks affecting the fiscal
accounts will pass through to the exchange rate.  In particular, the base for the inflation
tax is lower if dollarization is higher, a factor that increases the size of devaluation
needed to generate a given amount of revenue. This might stay the hand of government,
making it more reluctant to adopt inflationary policies (Calvo and Guidotti, 1990; Calvo,
1996). On the other hand, the perceived cost of devaluing may be smaller where pass-
through is high - as relative prices of goods will be relatively unaffected by currency
movements. Thus, with the inflation tax often a residual source of funds (rather than
being planned to achieve tax rate smoothing), a combination of dollarization (reducing
the inflation tax base) and higher pass-through (lowering the real economy effects of
nominal devaluation) would tend to increase nominal exchange rate volatility and thereby
add a risk-premium to real interest rates.
14 For instance, Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) argue that countries which are defacto  unable to
borrow in their own currencies will have a "fear of floating", regardless of the speed of exchange rate pass
through to prices; on the other hand, countries able to borrow will float only if they have a low pass-
through. If the banking system is dollarized, then this may be seen by the government as an implicit
liability and put it into the same category as if it were directly borrowing in foreign currency itself. Cf.
World Bank (2001).
15 An alternative motivation for engineering a surprise devaluation is to respond to a loss of price and wage
competitiveness. Rapid pass-through increases the scale of nominal depreciation needed to achieve a given
improvement in competitiveness.
16 With the bulk of banking being carried out in foreign currency, and prices essentially determined
externally, the real value of local currency-denominated debt (including currency) has no fixed anchor, and
the efficiency costs of surprise inflation are low. In such conditions, government debt denominated in local
currency (including banknotes) may take on some of the character of lottery tickets.
7Where government macro policy lacks credibility, currency risk and country risk (as
measured by the premium paid on government's FX borrowing) will both be high. "7
They are in fact correlated across Latin America (suggesting a wide variation in policy
credibility across this region), but not elsewhere (suggesting that other considerations can
also be important). The above discussion suggests that the degree of dollarization could
be a factor influencing currency risk more than country risk.
2.  Recent Trends in Deposit Dollarization
Although availability of data is still quite patchy, it continues to improve, and as it does,
it confirms the growing importance of deposit dollarization in emerging economies. Our
data set, shown in the Annex Table, contains data for 58 emerging economies.18
The share of dollar-denominated deposits in total onshore bank deposits for countries in
our sample has been growing by about 1.7 percentage points per annum during the l990s.
(This is a regression based estimate, drawn from a panel regression covering the period
1990-2000.)  9
For the 25 emerging economies for which we have data in respect of both 1995 and 1999,
the unweighted mean share of foreign currency deposits in total bank deposits rose from
37.1 per cent to 44.2 per cent and the median share rose even more sharply from 31.6 to
43.2.
The more traditional measure: foreign currency deposits as a share of M2, is available in
both years for 32 emerging economies. It rose from 25.8 per cent to 30.9 per cent, while
the median rose from 21.2 to 25.9; and the regression estimate of its annual rate of
increase over the decade of the 1  990s is 1.2 percentage points per annum.
In a score of countries, data for recent years shows half or more of deposits are
denominated in foreign currencies (Figure 1).
7 Powell  (2000)  suggests  that  such  a correlation  is a significant  indicator  of  a lack  of macroeconomic
policy credibility or trustworthiness. An alternative and more traditional measure of this state of  'original
sin"  (as  it is known  in the  literature)  is when  a country's  currency  is not  used  to denominate  long-term
contracts  or  for  borrowing  abroad.
18 The  data  are  drawn  from  four  main  sources.  We use data from  International Financial Statistics for
about 19 countries and from individual IMF country reports for about 29 countries. We also drew on the
data in Balino et al (1999), which runs up to 1995. Finally we employ data from national central bank
sources for 9 countries, mostly in Latin America, previously collected and kindly provided by Maria
Soledad Martinez-Peria.  Where conflicts existed between different sources, some judgement had to be
applied, with a preference for the longer consistent series.
9 Including country fixed effects and a first-order autoregressive coefficient.
8Figure 1: Foreign Currency Deposits as a Share of Total Deposits
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A ratchet effect?
The increase in average dollarization reflects increases in most of the individual countries
also, as seen in Figures 2-3.  However, there has been a sharp decline in a handful of
Eastern European countries.  Without denying that a form of "ratchet effect" (discussed
above) could apply with spontaneous dollarization, the recent declines in several
countries do indicate that the process is not impossible to reverse. Poland is probably the
most striking example in the data of an apparently sizeable and sustained decline in
dollarization. The figures for Estonia and Lithuania are also interesting in that they
suggest a decline, followed by a gradual resumption of the use of foreign currency
deposits as the decade of the 1990s  progressed.
9Figure 2:  Trends in Dollarization, 1995-2000
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Figure 3: Trends in dollarization, 1995-2000
Trend in deposit  dollarization







0  20  40  60  80
1995
Source: dollariz9599.xls
I0Certainly, the data suggests that there can be substantial movements in the dollarization
percentage. Because there may be a number of hidden breaks in the series definition,
these need to be taken with especial caution.  The year to year absolute value of the
change in dollarization averages 4.5 percentage points (median is 2.5 percentage points)
and there are several instances of annual changes of over 25 percentage points. 20
3.  Evidence from Regression Results
In this section we report on initial attempts to assess the empirical sign and size of the
five remaining relationships (aside from ratchet effects already considered above) that
have been highlighted in the introduction. Once again we stress the likelihood that most
of the variables in the regressions are endogenous, so these preliminary regression results
need to be interpreted with caution.  In particular, no causal interpretation has been
established.
Is faster pass-through associated with deposit dollarization?
As mentioned above, some theoretical considerations suggest that higher pass-through
and higher dollarization should be associated (which would increase the capacity of local
borrowers to assume exchange rate risk).  Is there an association in reality?
We examined this using our new data.  The main result is illustrated in Figure 4, where
an estimated pass-through coefficient (with its 95% confidence interval), estimated over
the period 1980-2000, is plotted against the mean dollarization ratio.  The upward-sloping
trend is unmistakable, and a simple regression of the point estimates of the pass-through
on dollarization reveals that a 10 percentage point increase in dollarization is associated
with an 0.08 (8%) increase in pass-through (t-statistic of 4.5).
20 The median of the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) of deposit dollarization
is 25 per cent.
11Figure 4:  Estimated Pass-Through Coefficient and Dollarization
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The pass-through coefficient shown in Figure 4 is measured as follows from a simple
panel of quarterly data from over 50 countries, 1980-2000.2I The dependent variable  p is
the log of the consumer price index; changes in it are modeled as impacted by changes in
the log dollar exchange rate e with a lagged 4-quarter change inp  as well as the real
exchange rate q (local consumer prices compared with dollar-adjusted US wholesale
prices) as an error-correction or catch-up term.  Thus the estimated equation is:
Ap=ao  +a,Ae+a 2 (pP 1 -p- 5 )+a 3 q- 4 (1)
The coefficient a, is taken as the pass-through coefficient. (Little difference is made by
employing instead a combination of al and a3 as in the cumulative pass-through after
one-year, or half-life etc).  Even using common coefficients for all countries, this model
explains two-thirds of the sample variability, as can be seen from regression A of Table
1. Making al a function of the mean dollarization rate, as in regression B, improves the
fit significantly and the coefficient is positive and highly significant. An increase of 10
percentage points in dollarization increases estimated pass-through by 0.064 (over 6 per
cent). Allowing country-specific values of a, improves the fit even more. The pass-
through coefficients used in Figure 4 are the point estimates from regression C of the
country-specific coefficients ai.22
21 Except where specified, all quarterly data employed is from IFS and all annual data from WDI.
22 A wide variety of methods is available to model pass-through, and there is also the question of time-
varying pass-through. Following Gonzalez (2000), we also estimated annual pass-through coefficients forTable 1: Estimate of dynamic model ofpass-through - Equation (1)
Dependent variable is zIp
A  B role of  C country-specific D country-specifc
common  model  dollarization  pass-through  pass-through
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  0.0109  (4.7)  0.0153  (8.3)  0.0207  (3.7)  0.0169  (12.9)
Time (x10
3
)  -0.125  (3.4)  -0.134  (4.5)  -0.206  (2.5)  -0.177  (8.9)
q(-4)  (x10 2)  -0.396  (1.7)  -0.681  (3.2)  -0.194  (2.8)  -0.192  (8.9)
p(-l)-p(-5)  0.134  (47.1)  0.127  (44.4)  0.107  (34.8)  0.113  (37.2)
zle  0.278  (36.7)  0.076  (7.6)  country  country
dollar*Ae  0.00609  (17.2)
Countries/obs.  49  2493  49  2493  49  2493  49  2493
Dates  80QI-99Q4  80Q  I -00Q4  80QI-00Q4  80Q  I  -00Q4
Method  SUR  SUR  Unweighted  panel  SUR
RSQ/DW  0.669  1.52  0.698  1.58  0.741  1.82  0.739  1.76
Note:  'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not individually  reported);
Method: SUR  is Seemingly  unrelated  regressions  system  estimate  of pool  coefficients;
The variable  dollar is share of foreign  currency  deposits  in  M2.
The conclusion  must  be that there  is a strong positive  correlation  between the degree  of
dollarization  and speed  of pass-through.
Does deposit dollarization shrink availability of credit?
Placing dollar funds abroad insulates the bank more effectively against exchange rate
risk, but reduces  the availability  of credit to local firms.  Our evidence is that this tends to
happen.  Regressing  the banking  system's  net foreign  assets (as a percentage  of money
supply M2) on the dollarization  ratio suggests  an approximate  50 per cent pass-through
of increases  in dollarization  to foreign  asset holdings.  (This is the implication  of the
coefficient  value of 0.538  in regression  C of Table  2a; the higher figure in regression  B
should be discounted  because  of the residual  autocorrelation  and the lower  figure in
regression  D reflects  the smaller numerator  of the dollarization  variable  used in that
regression).23
each  country  using  monthly  data. Once again  a regression  of the estimated  pass-through  coefficients
reveals  a highly  significant  coefficient  on dollarization.  (This  contrasts  with  the results  found  with  the
smaller  sample  of Gonzalez).
23 The  regression  approach  we have  adopted  is designed  to detect  broad  cross-country  trends. The data is
still  not good  enough  to pretend  to estimate  structural  models,  and  the relationships  we  report  vary in  their
statistical  robustness,  as is noted where  appropriate.  The regressions  of annual  relationships  reported  in this
table  represent  a specification  style  which  we have  found  useful  through  the remainder  of the paper. Thus,
we estimate  a panel  relationship  with  a single  first-order  autocorrelation  correction  to take account  of
detected  serial  correlation.  The panel  is usually  between  7 and 11  years long,  with  many  missing
observations.  Where  the explanatory  variable  is country-specific,  we  rely on estimates  made  with  a
common  intercept,  as use  of country  fixed-effects  in these  very  short  duration  panels  tends  to wash out any
differential  impact  of the variable  being  examined.  Where  the explanatory  variable  is common  across  all
countries,  we may  rely on estimates  with  country  fixed-effects.
13Some of this effect, especially where change in the dollarization rate is an explanatory
variable, as in Equation A, could be seen as a mechanical valuation change effect, in that
appreciation of the dollar would increase both dollarization and the net foreign holdings
as a share of the portfolio even if no other change occurred. Nevertheless, albeit
mechanical, it is real. A simple and rough way of gauging the importance of the
mechanical exchange rate effect is to include the rate of exchange rate change in the
previous year as an additional explanatory variable. Equation E shows that this still
leaves a sizable and significant non-mechanical effect about twice the original estimate of
Equation A.  Including the exchange rate change in the other equations in which
dollarization enters only in its level, and not in  the rate of change, suggests that there is
no significant mechanical valuation effect influencing those estimates (compare
Equations F-H with B-D).
Dollarization thus does appear to shrink the availability of credit, as compared with a
situation where the same amount of deposits are held onshore, but in local currency.
14Table 2a:  Dollarization and the netforeign assets of banks
Dependent variable:f is log net foreign assets of banks
A  B  C  D
dep. var.  af  f  f  f
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
C  0.405  (0.4)  country  country  -3.551  (0.9)
Jdollar  0.527  (5.1)
J(-2)  -0.198  (9.7)
dollar  0.697  (5.8)  0.538  (5.5)  0.291  (4.2)
dollar(-2)  0.0177  (0.6)
Ar(l)  0.676  (24.3)  0.768  (34.1)
Countries/obs.  53  275  53  410  53  350  48  260
Years  1990-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000
Method  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel
RSQIDW  0.310  2.49  0.546  0.47  0.871  2.35  0.826  1.90
Note:  'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not individually  reported);
dollar is share  of FX in M2 (A, B, C);  in  deposits  (D). ar(l) is first order  autocorrelation
coefficient.
[Pool used:  A-C:fsm-fcd; D: hsf-fsm]
Table 2a (continued): Dollarization and the net  foreign assets of banks
Dependent variable:f is log net foreign assets of banks
E  F  G  H
dep.  var.  Af  f  f  f
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  -0.869  (0.9)  country  country  -1.769  (0.4)
Adollar  0.256  (2.3)
At-2)  -0.198  (10.2)
dollar  0.750  (5.8)  0.623  (5.2)  0.251  (3.4)
dollar(-2)  0.0178  (0.6)
Aexch.  rate %  11.12  (5.5)  -3.50  (1.5)  0.498  (0.3)  3.039  (1.9)
ar(l)  0.682  (23.9)  0.757  (31.9)
Countries/obs.  53  275  53  364  53  350  48  260
Years  1990-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000  1990-2000
Method  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel
RSQJDW  0.275  2.44  0.551  0.45  0.878  2.48  0.830  1.97
Note:  'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not  individually  reported);
dollar is share  of FX in M2 (A, B, C);  in deposits  (D). ar( l) is first  order autocorrelation
coefficient.
[Pool used: A-C:fsm-fcd;  D: hsf-fsm]
15Table 2b: Dollarization and offshore deposits
Dependent variable: AfI change in nonbank holdings of deposits in reporting offshore banks as % M2
A  B  C  D
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  1.519  (1.5)  0.254  (0.3)  0.648  (0.6)  -0.310  (0.3)
Adollar  0.546  (4.6)  0.602  (5.0)  0.441  (4.6)  0.492  (4.3)
laggedf  -0.096  (3.9)  -0.016  (0.6)  -0.098  (3.9)  -0.015  (0.6)
lagged  dollar  -0.019  (0.7)  -0.012  (0.5)  0.010  (0.5)  0.011  (0.5)
ar(l)  -0.239  (4.1)  -0.447  (4.8)  -0.256  (4.4)  -0.452  (4.5)
Countries/obs.  45  127  45  83  45  117  45  74
Years  1995-2000  1995-2000  1995-2000  1995-2000
Method  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel
RSQIDW  0.282  2.16  0.362  1.82  0.298  2.27  0.324  2.09
Note:  dollar is share of FX in M2 (A,B); in deposits (C,D);  Lag length: 1 year (A,  C); 2 years (B,D).  ar(l)
is first order autocorrelation coefficient.  [Pool  used:  A-C:  offsftore]
Table 2b (continued): Dollarization and offshore deposits
Dependent variable: zf: change in nonbank holdings of deposits in reporting offshore banks as % M2
E  F  G  H
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  1.129  (1.2)  0.161  (0.2)  0.207  (0.6)  -0.749  (0.9)
Adollar  0.250  (2.1)  0.262  (2.4)  0.191  (1.9)  0.195  (2.0)
taggedf  -0.115  (5.1)  -0.043  (2.2)  -0.117  (5.2)  -0.044  (2.1)
lagged  dollar  -0.032  (1.3)  -0.017  (0.9)  0.009  (0.0)  0.006  (0.3)
Aexch. rate %  8.894  (5.1)  9.040  (6.1)  9..070  (5.2)  9.293  (6.0)
ar(l)  -0.274  (5.2)  -0.576  (7.0)  -0.279  (5.4)  -0.595  (6.5)
Countries/obs.  45  127  45  82  45  117  45  74
Years  1995-2000  1995-2000  1995-2000  1995-2000
Method  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel
RSQ/DW  0.408  2.13  0.560  1.42  0.434  2.20  0.546  1.49
Note:  dollar is share of FX in M2 (A,  B); in deposits (C,D);  Lag length: I year (A,  C); 2 years (B,  D). ar(l)
is first order autocorrelation coefficient.  [Pool  used: A-C:  offshore]
But this conclusion does raise the question as to whether increased dollarization is merely
a substitute for offshore deposits.  In other words, when we observe low dollarization,
does this mean that depositors have simply placed their funds directly in banks located
abroad (whether in violation of exchange controls or not). If so, more dollarization might
reflect less holding of offshore deposits, in which case the finding that only half of the
dollar deposits were onlent would be less worrying. Although this possibility seems
plausible, we were unable to confirm it using regression analysis employing the BIS data
on the country of origin of cross-border nonbank deposits placed in reporting banks in the
main industrial countries. Indeed, the regressions of Table 2b suggests that there is a
strong positive  association between changes in the degree of dollarization and offshore
deposits. We suspect that this may reflect the influence of offshore centers on the data on
international deposits. Undoubtedly this relationship needs further examination.  For one
thing there is again a mechanical valuation effect potentially at work. Once again
16correcting for this by including the rate of exchange rate change confirms that there still
is a non-mechanical effect of about half the original estimate (compare Equations E-H
with A-D). 24
Dollarization and interest spreads
If increased dollarization does squeeze availability of credit, we would expect an increase
in interest spreads. Indeed, this appears to be the case (using the difference between loan
and deposit interest rates quoted in IFS).  A simple panel regression as shown in Table 3a
indicates a correlation with a sizeable impact of increases in dollarization: the point
estimates associate a ten percentage point increase in deposit dollarization with an
increase of about 150 basis points in quoted spreads (regressions A and C).  Of course
these can be seen as very under-specified equations, especially insofar as coverage of
country characteristics are concerned: nevertheless, inclusion of country fixed effects to
partially does not reduce the size of the effect or eliminate its significance of
dollarization, at least when expressed as a share of M2 (regression B).
Table 3  a: Dollarization and intermediation spread
Dependent  variable:  difference  between  quoted  loan  and deposit  interest  rates  spr
A  B  C  D
Estimate (t-stat)  Estimate (t-stat)  Estimate (t-stat)  Estimate (t-stat)
c  8.209  (3.9)  Country  6.474  (3.8)  Country
dollar  0.155  (2.7)  0.344  (2.5)  0.144  (3.9)  0.113  (1.0)
ar(l)  0.470  (16.7)  0.343  (10.0)  0.423  (15.1)  0.330  (8.8)
Countries/obs.  50  182  50  182  48  168  48  168
Years  1994-2000  1994-2000  1994-2000  1994-2000
Method  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel
RSQ/DW  0.621  1.44  0.798  2.38  0.614  1.67  0.731  2.37
Note:  dollar  is share in M2 (A,B);  in deposits  (C,D).  ar(l) is first  order autocorrelation  coefficient.
[pools  used:  spread]
Table 3b:  Dollarization and intermediation spread
Dependent  variable:  difference  between  quoted  loan  and deposit  interest  rates  spr
A  B
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate (t-stat)
c  -4.357  (0.2)  9.935  (0.5)
dollar  -0.106  (0.5)  -0.218  (1.4)
spread-fx  1.240  (3.8)  1.375  (4.1)
ar(l)  0.947  (17.0)  0.934  (19.5)
Countries/obs.  7  19  7  19
Years  1994-2000  1994-2000
Method  Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel
RSQ/DW  0.931  2.18  0.938  2.55
Note:  dollar  is  share  in M2  (A);  in deposits  (B). spread-fx  is the  difference  between  quoted  loan  and
deposit  interest  rates  for  FX-denominated  business.  ar(l) is first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient.
[pools used: spread]
24 It should  be mentioned  that  we  have  not  been  able  to examine  directly  the  various  forms  of round-
tripping  which  may  occur,  notably  the  practice  of dollar  borrowing  from  local  banks  with  the  proceeds
placed  abroad  or  in local  dollar  deposits  for  tax,  exchange  control  or  other  reasons.
17However, the interesting hypothesis of Catao and Terrones that an increase in
dollarization would widen interest spreads for local currency borrowers more than for
foreign currency borrowers does not seem to find support in this data. Using the very
limited data available for foreign currency spreads Oust eight countries - see Figure 5),
Table 3b implies that the level of dollarization does not influence the relationship
between dollar-based spreads and local currency based spreads.
Figure 5: Intermediation Spreads: Local Currency and Foreign Exchange Business
Spreads:  local  currency  and FX
monthly  average  1997-99
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Dollarization and currency risk
A possible correlation between the degree of dollarization and the currency risk premium
has been discussed above.  Preliminary examination of this issue suggests that there may
indeed be a positive statistical association between dollarization and real interest rates;
however, it is not clear that the relation is a robust one.
We used real deposit interest rates, as these are available for a much wider range of
countries than wholesale rates.  Included on its own in a panel regression (along with the
first order autocorrelation coefficient), dollarization does appear to increase the level of
real deposit interest rates (regression A of Table 4). The effect becomes insignificant
when country fixed effects are included, though this should not be considered decisive
given the small number of cross-sections (regression B).  More important, the effect
remains of similar size and still significant when data on the fiscal deficit (regression C)
18and the current account of the balance of payments (regression D), variables that are used
to explain the real interest rate, are is also included. However, these results hold only
when dollarization is expressed as a percentage of deposits; when M2 is the denominator,
the variable becomes insignificant (Regressions E-H).  Nevertheless, this preliminary
analysis suggests that there may be something to the conjecture that dollarization
increases the real rate of interest.
Table 4: Dollarization and real interest rates
Dependent  variable  is real deposit  interest  rate r
A  B  C  D
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  3.516  (0.8)  country  -1.582  (0.3)  -2.859  (0.6)
dollar  0.247  (2.7)  0.194  (1.0)  0.255  (2.8)  0.206  (2.1)
deficit  1.322  (2.7)  1.084  (2.1)
bop ca  0.764  (2.5)
ar(l)  0.474  (9.  1)  0.235  (3.2)  0.378  (6.1)  0.440  (6.8)
Countries/obs.  34  147  34  147  34  109  34  108
Years  1990-1999  1990-1999  1990-1999  1990-1999
Method  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel
RSQ/DW  0.403  1.84  0.559  1.94  0.370  1.32  0.406  1.50
Note:  'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not individually  reported);  dollar  is share
of foreign  currency  deposits  in total  deposits.  ar(t) is first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient.
[pool: avail_hsf  intl
Table 4 continued: Dollarization and real interest rates
Dependent  variable  is real  deposit  interest  rate  r
E  F  G  H
Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)  Estimate  (t-stat)
c  12.62  (3.0)  8.200  (1.8)  2.327  (0.4)  1.923  (0.3)
dollar  0.006  (0.1)  0.163  (1.4)  0.201  (1.5)  0.134  (1.0)
deficit  1.544  (2.8)  1.181  (2.1)
bop ca  0.754  (2.2)
ar(l)  0.563  (4.5)  0.522  (11.3)  0.445  (7.5)  0.494  (8.2)
Countries/obs.  51  249  34  176  34  125  34  124
Years  1990-1999  1990-1999  1990-1999  1990-1999
Method  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel  Unweighted panel
RSQ/DW  0.467  1.95  0.450  1.89  0.411  1.47  0.435  1.63
Note:  'Country'  means  country-specific  coefficients  estimated  (not individually  reported);  dollar  is share
of foreign  currency  deposits  in M2. ar(l) is first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient.
[pool: A: int_not_ury;  others: availihsf  intl
194.  Dollarization and Banking System Risk
Drawing the strands together and simplifying we see the elements of a potential structural
problem: factors leading to increased deposit dollarization could result in higher interest
rates, lower credit supply and greater vulnerability of the banking system.
Even if bank margins widen, the net impact of increased dollarization on the sustained
profitability of banks is unclear.  For example, to the extent that dollar lending does also
increase, this may also increase vulnerabilities to indirect currency risk (when borrowers
cannot absorb the FX risk).
There may also be an increase in banking risks associated with waves of currency
speculation when depositors can choose the currency of denomination. This may not be
obvious at first sight: after all, if deposit dollarization were not allowed, an increase in the
perceived risk of a major devaluation would tend to result in deposit outflows presenting
each bank with a liquidity problem. 25 Thus, at first sight, availability of dollar deposits
appears to have the potential to insulate banks against deposit outflows triggered by a
change in exchange rate expectations. Depositors need not withdraw their deposits if
they can simply adjust the currency denomination of their deposit portfolio with a
telephone call to the bank. 26
But currency switching by depositors, notably in response to shifting expectations about
future exchange rate movements, is a source of volatility to banks, increasing their need
for liquid assets and further reducing the supply of loanable funds. Thus, faced with an
abrupt change in the currency composition of its deposits, a bank suddenly finds itself
exposed to foreign exchange risk and will need to hedge this, effectively putting pressure
on the value of the local currency.
Clearly the bank will again need to have sufficient liquidity to face the risk of this
happening suddenly -perhaps more so because of the ease with which local depositors
can make these switches (again putting downward pressure on the availability of loanable
funds).
Even with adequate liquidity in local currency, the bank is vulnerable in these conditions.
After all, forced sale of these local currency liquid assets will, unless the central bank
intervenes, depress the currency and result in capital losses for the bank.  This risk can be
met with adequate procedures to make sure that the rates of exchange offered by the retail
deposit desks of the bank are up to date and embody a risk cushion.  However, it is not
hard to see that, especially where a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime has been in effect
for some time, such procedures may not be fully in effect.  Overall, the bank may not
25 The ability  of the central  bank as lender  of last resort  to compensate  such  outflows  may  be limited,  either
de facto  or de jure by its attempt  to maintain  the parity  (Fischer,  1999).
26 Though  this will  not be enough  for depositors  who  fear  that their  dollar  deposits  might  be frozen  as part
of the currency  crisis.
20maintain its hedge sufficiently current, and indeed may be implicitly assuming that the
central bank will look after it.
The scenario painted is one in which the banks, fearful of exchange rate risk and of
currency switching by depositors, hold high liquid reserves both in local currency and in
foreign placements, driving up local real interest rates yet remaining with a residual
indirect exchange risk. This may in turn imply an unrecognized implicit risk for
government if it will be faced with the costs of a bank bail-out in the event of a
devaluation.
Although the data are not rich enough to allow much quantification of these dimensions
of banking risk, the scale of dollarization and the speed of some changes in dollarization
rates noted in our data set suggest that they are not negligible.
5.  Concluding Remarks
Despite declines in a few countries, the general trend to increased use of foreign-
currency-denominated deposits in emerging market banking systems has continued in the
last few years.
This trend has not been innocuous. In addition to its propensity to complicate monetary
stabilization policy, deposit dollarization presents a number of structural challenges.
This paper presents empirical evidence suggesting that, although dollarization may be
partly a substitute for holding deposits abroad, a sizable fraction (about half on average)
of funds switched to dollar deposit accounts are effectively exported through the banking
system, thereby reducing the supply of credit.  This may explain why we find that
dollarization is associated with an increase in banking spreads. The conjecture that
dollarization would tend to raise wholesale interest rates systematically through a peso-
premium receives some, though far from conclusive, support, but needs further empirical
examination.
In dollarized economies where banks are imperfectly hedged against exchange risk, for
example where they have substantial foreign currency denominated loans to local firms,
the risk to bank solvency from devaluation is considerable. Especially where the
dollarization is accompanied by a faster pass-through of exchange rate changes, as
appears to be commonly the case, the government may be induced by fiscal pressures to
adopt policies that can result in steep devaluations. But if they neglect the consequences
of such actions on the solvency of the banking system, they may find that the inflation tax
fails to yield any net revenue, after account is taken of the implicit knock-on liabilities to
the state from bank failure.
Although some transition economies have managed to reverse or slow dollarization by
establishing credible currencies and a stable macro environment, dollarization is not
going to wither away. Proscribing it is unlikely to be the most effective policy response,
21and could be counterproductive.  Short of this, many other policy tools influence the
degree of dollarization. These include the design of various taxes and tax-like measures
including reserve requirements. Lender of last resort and other safety net features, to the
extent that they offer equal cover to dollar-denominated and local currency deposits, are
often seen as providing an implicit subsidy to the expansion of dollarization (Broda and
Levy-Yeyati, 2000).  Relevant policy will importantly also include the level of inflation
tax, whether one-off ("surprise") or steady-state.
There are obviously implications for optimal monetary, exchange rate and financial
sector policy. Most authors assert that high dollarization implies the desirability of
currency stability because of the risks of exchange rate volatility in the presence of
dollarization (cf. Berg and Borensztein, 2000)27,  though this begs the question as to
whether a currency peg regime actually delivers the hoped-for stability, or whether it
transforms a probability distribution with heavy weight on small monthly exchange rate
changes to one with a low but non-negligible weight on high monthly exchange rates.
Otherwise dollarization reinforces the need for offsetting structural policies. The key
needs are to (i) help ensure that the various participants internalize social risk and (ii)
help strengthen the infrastructure supporting the importation of loanable funds from
abroad.  Internalizing social risk is an attempt to move the system closer to incentive
compatibility. This could include stricter rules, taxes or risk-weights limiting indirect
exposure to foreign exchange risk. Mechanisms for importing funds from abroad could
include the use of structured finance or securitized loans sold to foreign lenders.  The
practicality of all such policies would need to be reviewed, but such a review is beyond
the scope of the current paper.
27 Another  question  addressed  by Berg  and  Borensztein  is whether  the link  between  money  and  prices  is
stronger  if one  includes  foreign  currency  deposits:  their conclusion  is yes.
22Box  1
Currency substitution and transactions dollarization
Even where there are no FX deposits, dollars may circulate freely and be used in
transactions.  An early literature on this phenomenon of "currency substitution" focused
on the question of agents holding non-deposit cash in multiple currency denominations.
It examined the impact of increased currency substitution on macroeconomic volatility,
and specifically the way in which a shrinking domestic-currency money base (resulting
from currency substitution) risked increasing the amplitude of the response of
equilibrium exchange rates and inflation to nominal shocks (such as a change in the rate
of monetary expansion) (Girton and Roper, 1981; Kareken and Wallace, 1981).  As
noted by Berg and Borensztein (2000), McKinnon (1996) justifies his recommendation
for an international monetary standard and a world monetary authority largely on this
volatility of exchange rates under currency substitution.
The major technical differences between currency substitution and dollarization are the
facts that (i) currency notes and coin are not interest-bearing, with the result that an
increased expected rate of depreciation cannot simply be compensated by increased
interest payments, and (ii) as liabilities of market institutions, bank deposits affect bank
profitability and the credit market.
Dollarization of transactions has also been widely observed, though difficult to measure
in a systematic way. It can include the posting of the prices of goods and services in FX,
even if payment is made in local currency, as well as the actual use of dollars in
transactions. Dollarization of transactions is often associated with rapid price pass-
through.
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25Annex Table Al:  Foreign Currency Deposits as a % of M2
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Albania  2.1  1.3  23.8  20.4  18.8  18.7  21.9  18.3  16.8  18.2  19.9
Angola  7.3  29.4  42.9  53.0  66.9  67.6
Argentina  33.7  34.9  35.4  40.7  43.8  45.1  45.7  47.3  49.0  52.5
Armenia  40.5  20.4  21.0  33.5  39.5  38.2
Azerbaijan  26.3  22.1  24.6  28.9  32.9
Belarus  40.6  54.3  30.7  27.3
Bolivia  66.2  67.1  69.5  71.1  69.2  67.3  80.3  79.9  80.8  82.7  81.3
Bulgaria  12.0  34.0  25.8  20.5  32.5  27.2  50.5  43.6  39.2  39.1
Cambodia  26.3  36.3  51.4  56.3  63.1  62.5  54.2  60.9  68.0
Comoros  0.1  0.3  0.8
Congo,  DR  35.8  29.0
Costa  Rica  23.5  30.7  28.3  26.5  26.6  34.5  31.7  34.1  37.5
Croatia  53.8  50.3  57.5  59.6  61.7  66.3  64.0
Czech  8.1  7.0  5.3  6.0  11.4  11.3  11.7  11.6
Dominica  3.0  3.9  3.5  2.5  1.5
Ecuador  3.3  3.6  5.3  6.3  8.7  15.7  18.6  25.1
Egypt  46.1  47.9  32.2  27.7  27.5  27.2  23.4  20.6  19.6  20.8  24.7
El Salvador  3.4  2.9  4.2  3.7  4.5  5.0  6.4  7.5  7.8
Estonia  23.0  3.8  9.9  10.9  10.8  16.0  16.1  14.7  13.7
Georgia  80.1  30.8  14.8  20.8  29.1  35.4
Guinea  6.5  6.9  10.0  9.4  9.6  12.6  12.9  12.8
Guinea-Bissau  41.5  34.7  31.6  30.9  31.1  31.2  38.3
Honduras  1.4  3.0  5.3  6.9  12.8  17.0  25.3  23.4  23.9
Hungary  12.2  16.5  14.3  18.7  20.4  26.6  6.7  5.0  4.4
Jamaica  11.9  12.5  18.7  16.9  19.6  16.3  18.6
Lao PDR  42.0  39.4  36.8  41.4  34.4  42.4  40.4  56.7  67.1
Latvia  27.2  27.5  31.1
Lebanon  65.1  59.9  71.3  75.3
Lithuania  44.2  26.9  26.8  24.8  21.3  24.2  30.4  34.0
Macedonia,  FYR  14.8  13.2  19.2  21.5  19.2
Malawi  10.6  8.0  10.3  22.0  12.0  17.9
Mexico  11.1  11.8  9.7  11.1  16.5  17.5  18.0  12.7  11.9
Moldova  10.3  11.0  9.9  9.5  22.6  27.5  24.6
Mongolia  7.5  33.0  19.5  20.5  24.2  29.0  23.8  24.7
Mozambique  11.8  16.7  23.2  25.3  41.3  41.4  34.9  34.9  35.2
Netherlands  Antilles  15.3  17.0  16.6  16.3  15.9  17.4  15.9  15.4  14.5  15.6  15.3
Nicaragua  27.3  26.2  33.6  46.1  48.2  57.1  59.2  62.9  64.7
Pakistan  2.6  8.9  11.9  13.9  13.6  18.0  22.8  23.8  9.6
Paraguay  35.0  32.5  27.6  32.7  37.6  44.0
Peru  38.6  55.5  57.8  58.9  58.9  57.1  61.5  53.9  54.1
Philippines  17.4  18.0  21.0  22.6  20.9  21.5  37.3
Poland  31.4  24.7  24.8  28.8  36.4  19.3  12.5  9.9  6.9  4.5
Romania  2.9  3.9  15.3  29.0  22.1  21.8  23.4  28.5  32.6  37.6  40.4
Russia  29.5  28.8  20.0  19.4  17.6  30.4  29.5  26.9
Sao  Tome  & Principe  38.3  29.6  34.9  37.9  39.2  33.5
Saudi  Arabia  22.9  21.5  19.2  21.3  20.2  19.2  17.0  16.5  17.9  16.5  15.6
Slovakia  11.2  12.9  11.3  10.2  10.5  14.7  14.5  15.6
Tajikistan  33.7  16.1  13.5  21.4  25.1
Trinidad  & Tobago  6.9  16.1  16.5  18.9  17.9
Turkey  23.2  29.7  33.7  37.9  45.8  46.1  44.8  46.4  42.9  44.7  49.4
Uganda  10.1  11.2  11.7  12.8  13.2  13.0
Ukraine  19.4  31.7  22.6  16.6  13.0  20.8  24.5  22.7
Uruguay  80.1  78.5  76.2  73.3  74.1  76.1
Uzbekistan  20.1  5.1  22.5  15.5  8.0  6.9  4.2
Venezuela  0.1  3.4  2.2  2.3  2.2
Viet  Nam  25.9  20.9  20.4  19.7  19.3  22.0  25.3  26.6
Yemen  10.8  12.1  19.7  20.7  20.9
Zambia  8.4  17.0  23.1  23.8  36.0Table A2: Foreign Currency Deposits as a % of Total Deposits
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Albania  30.8  30.6  31.8  28.9  23.5  25.2  28.1
Angola  9.3  36.0  57.7  72.1  80.6  83.2
Argentina  47.2  48.1  47.1  52.2  55.5  57.4  56.4  57.2  58.2  62.3
Armenia  68.7  52.5  58.4  72.2  69.5  62.6
Azerbaijan  49.1  50.2  56.8  62.8  71.9
Belarus  34.6  63.5  35.6
Bolivia  79.8  77.3  78.6  79.1  77.8  76.8  89.8  89.1  89.5  90.9  89.5
Bulgaria  38.4  29.1  23.0  35.8  30.4  55.9  55.8  53.2  53.3
Cambodia  84.3  84.3  91.8  94.0  94.0  92.5  92.3  93.2
Comoros  0.2  0.5  1.2
Congo,  DR  68.1  78.3
CostaRica  26.8  34.8  32.4  30.4  31.1  40.9  35.7  38.5  41.9
Croatia  59.3  66.6  67.6  68.9  73.7  71.6
Czech  8.9  7.8  5.9  6.7  12.7  12.7  13.3  13.3
Dominica  0.2  2.7  3.5  3.1  2.2  1.3  0.9  1.7  2.2
Ecuador  3.8  4.2  6.1  7.2  9.8  17.4  20.5  27.6
Egypt  54.3  55.6  37.0  32.0  32.0  31.6  27.2  24.0  22.9  24.5  28.7
El Salvador  4.1  3.4  4.9  4.1  5.0  5.5  7.0  8.1  8.4
Estonia  17.2  15.5  21.0  20.6  18.9  1,5.9
Georgia  46.4  58.3  68.4  78.1
Guinea  19.0  22.6  23.9  24.4
Guinea-Bissau  60.9
Honduras  1.8  3.9  6.6  9.0  16.9  21.2  30.6  27.4  27.6
Hungary  7.9  5.8  5.3
Jamaica  11.9  12.5  21.0  18.9  22.1  18.4  21.0
Lao PDR  53.0  48.8  63.4  71.5
Latvia  1.7  2.0
Lebanon  68.2  62.5  73.8  77.7
Lithuania  62.7  38.8  40.6  38.2  32.7  36.4  43.7  4.5.6
Macedonia,  FYR  20.9  19.3  26.4  28.5  24.6
Malawi  13.5  27.9  16.1  23.4
Mexico  13.0  13.6  11.1  12.7  18.9  19.6  20.1  14.2  13.4
Moldova  20.3  19.3  43.8  49.6  41.8
Mongolia  36.4  41.0  35.9  40.9
Mozambique  53.6  54.0  44.0  43.1  43.2
Netherlands  Antilles  16.8  18.6  18.2  17.7  17.3  18.8  17.3  16.6  15.5  16.7  15.4
Nicaragua  40.3  36.2  46.0  60.2  59.6  67.8  66.9  69.6  71.0
Pakistan  25.2  30.8  31.0  12.6
Paraguay  43.4  40.4  34.1  39.1  45.6  53.7
Peru  48.7  65.1  66.8  66.4  67.2  65.0  68.0  58.9  58.5
Philippines  40.9
Poland  43.2  23.7  15.1  11.7  8.0  5.3
Romania  3.6  4.7  20.4  37.9  27.9  27.6  28.4  33.4  37.3  43.2  47.0
Russia  39.9  39.2  28.3  27.4  24.6  43.3  40.4  36).8
Sao  Tome  & Principe  38.7  42.7  46.4  50.5  45.0
Saudi  Arabia  30.0  27.2  24.0  26.3  25.1  23.4  20.4  19.8  21.3  20.2  18.7
Slovakia  12.5  14.2  12.5  11.4  11.8  16.4  16.3  17.6
Tajikistan  41.5  43.6  62.8  72.4
Trinidad  & Tobago  16.6  16.8  19.1  18.1
Turkey  26.4  33.0  37.4  42.2  49.9  49.8  47.6  49.1  45.2  46.9  51.9
Uganda  15.7  16.3  17.2  18.0  17.9  17.4
Ukraine  42.1  36.4  29.3  25.5  38.9  44.0  38.5
Uzbekistan  13.8  13.0  7.5
Venezuela  0.1  3.8  2.5  2.6  2.5
VietNam  44.9  42.0  41.8  34.6  32.1  34.1  36.6  39.1
Zambia  10.2  20.1  27.3  28.2  42.6
27Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2730  Antidumping as Safeguard Policy  J. Michael Finger  December 2001  R. Simms
Francis Ng  37156
Sonam Wangchuk
WPS2731  An Alternative Technical Education  Gladys Lopez-Acevedo  December 2001  M. Geller
System in Mexico: A Reassessment  85155
of CONALEP
WPS2732  The Unbalanced Uruguay Round  J. Michael Finger  December 2001  R. Simms
Outcome: The New Areas in Future  Julio J. Nogues  37156
WTO Negotiations
WPS2733  Trade Policy Reform and Poverty  Bernard Hoekman  December 2001  R. Martin
Alleviation  Constantine Michalopoulos  39065
Maurice Schiff
David Tarr
WPS2734  Agricultural Markets in Benin and  Marcel Fafchamps  December 2001  P. Kokila
Malawi: The Operation and  Eleni Gabre-Madhin  33716
Performance of Traders
WPS2735  Shifting Tax Burdens through  Bernard Gauthier  December 2001  H. Sladovich
Exemptions and Evasion: An Empirical Ritva Reinikka  37698
Investigation of Uganda
WPS2736  Social Policy and Macroeconomics:  F. Desmond McCarthy  December 2001  J. Turner
The  Irish Experience  81767
WPS2737  Mode of Foreign Entry, Technology  Aaditya Mattoo  December 2001  R. Martin
Transfer, and Foreign Direct  Marcelo Olarreaga  39065
Investment  Policy  Kamal Saggi
WPS2738  Assisting the Transition from  Emanuela Galasso  December 2001  C. Cunanan
Workfare to Work: A Randomized  Martin Ravallion  32301
Experiment  Agustin Salvia
WPS2739  Poverty, Education, and Health in  Peter Lanjouw  December  2001  P. Sader
Indonesia: Who Benefits from Public  Menno Pradhan  33902
Spending?  Fadia Saadah
Haneen Sayed
Robert Sparrow
WPS2740  Are Men Benefiting from the New  Omar Arias  December  2001  S. Nyairo
Economy? Male Economic  34635
Marginalization in Argentina, Brazil,
and Costa RicaPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2741  Female Wage Inequality in Latin  Luz A. Saavedra  December 2001  S. Nyairo
American Labor Markets  34635
WPS2742  Sectoral Allocation by Gender of  Wendy V. Cunningham  December 2001  S. Nyairo
Latin American Workers over the  34635
Liberalization Period of the 1960s
'NPS2743  Breadwinner  or Caregiver? How  Wendy V. Cunningham  December 2001  S. Nyairo
Household Role Affects Labor  34635
Choices in Mexico
WPS2744  Gender and the Allocation of  Nadeem llahi  December 2001  S. Nyairo
Adult Time: Evidence from the Peru  34635
LSMS Panel Data
WPS2745  Children's Work and Schooling:  Nadeem llahi  December 2001  S. Nyairo
Does Gender Matter? Evidence  34635
from the Peru LSMS Panel Data
WPS2746  Complementarity between Multilateral  Dilip Ratha  December 2001  S. Crow
Lending and Private Flows to Developing  30763
Countries: Some Empirical Results
WPS2747  Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid? Sarah Bales  December  2001  H. Sladovich
Appropriate Comparators in a  Martin Rama  37698
Developing Country